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ABSTRACT
The “dormant” Commerce Clause’s prohibition on extraterritorial
regulation has tested state efforts to battle greenhouse gas-induced climate
change using clean energy policies. This is partly due to the structure of
the North American power grid. Simply put, the electricity generated by
an in-state power facility might be consumed by any other state connected
to that same interconnection during normal operations. This cross-border
flow, sale, and consumption of electricity places the grid within the regulatory
grasp of the United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause. Congress
therefore has authority to regulate the interstate electricity market. The
Supreme Court has also interpreted an implicit but “dormant” limitation
in the Commerce Clause, prohibiting state legislation that regulates interstate
commerce. As a result, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) has been granted authority by Congress over the transmission
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and wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce, leaving the
regulation of local electricity generators and utility rates (retail markets)
to the individual states.
Another reality states face is the uniform mixing of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere. Because of this, state regulations promoting renewable
energy and targeting emissions reductions run the risk of being ineffective
if they do not take into account the true measure of the emissions causing
local harm. In other words, states’ climate change prevention policies
chance falling short of actually reducing in-state emissions if they do not
take into account out-of-state emitters that contribute to emissions felt instate. Thus, the structure of the grid and the properties of greenhouse gases
have left state efforts to battle climate change through clean energy regulation
that promotes greenhouse gas reductions particularly vulnerable to
challenges under the dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition against
extraterritorial regulation.
This Article analyzes the judicial application of the dormant Commerce
Clause’s prohibition on extraterritorial regulation to challenges to state
clean energy legislation. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have each
taken up the issue of whether such regulations have an improper
extraterritorial reach, but their analyses and holdings on the issue appear
to have muddied the waters with inconsistent applications of an already
convoluted principle. However, climate change prevention policies target
a broad range of industries, and the fact patterns before each of the
circuits varied not only in the energy sector being regulated, but in scope.
Thus, the question is whether the inconsistent holdings among the circuits
were due solely to the differences in the particular facts of the case before
it, solely as a result of differences in doctrinal interpretation, or some
combination of the two.
The answer to that question could have important implications for states
moving forward with aggressive policies seeking to reduce emissions. The
paucity of federal involvement has prompted state governments to take the
lead in enacting progressive legislation to mitigate the local harms of
climate change. However, as it stands, states are left uncertain of whether
their legitimate climate change goals and resulting legislation are vulnerable
to dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background on the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Extraterritoriality Principle
Article I of the United States Constitution grants the authority “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States” to Congress. 1 The Commerce
Clause has also been interpreted by courts to “have a ‘negative’ aspect
that denies the States power to unjustifiably discriminate against or burden
the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”2 The rationale behind the
dormant Commerce Clause is that the United States Constitution was
meant to “prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic
protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory
measures.”3 In practice, the Commerce Clause limits state interference
with interstate commerce.
A state statute runs afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause when it (1)
discriminates against interstate commerce for the benefit of in-state
commerce, (2) regulates commerce wholly outside of the state, or (3) if it
excessively burdens interstate commerce relative to the local benefits
produced.4 Statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce or regulate
commerce entirely outside state borders are subject to strict scrutiny,
almost guaranteeing the law will be invalidated.5 To survive strict scrutiny
a state must show the regulation protects a legitimate state interest, and achieving
that interest could not be accomplished by “available nondiscriminatory
means.”6 On the other hand, a state regulation that burdens, but does not
discriminate against, interstate commerce is subject to the balancing test
of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., and such a regulation shall be invalidated

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (Rocky Mountain Farmers II), 730
F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (quoting Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994)).
3. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel (Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. I), 43 F. Supp.
3d 1171, 1176 (D. Colo. 2014) (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.
383, 390 (1994)).
4.
DANIEL A. FARBER & CINNAMON CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 190 (Robert
C. Clark et al. eds., 1st ed. 2018).
5. See Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause
Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43
ENV’T. L. REV. 295, 301 (2013).
6. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1087 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S.131, 138 (1986)); see also Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1176 (explaining
that discriminatory or extraterritorial statutes must be “demonstrably justified” and “unrelated
to economic protectionism,” or they will be struck down).
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only “if it imposes a burden on interstate commerce which is not commensurate
with the local benefits secured.”7
The dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition on state regulations that
“ha[ve] the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly
outside that State’s borders” is referred to as the extraterritoriality principle.8
The Supreme Court in Healy v. Beer Inst. held that the dormant Commerce
Clause’s prohibition on extraterritorial regulation proscribed “the application
of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s
borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.” 9
Moreover, a statute that directly controls “wholly” out-of-state commerce
is invalid, regardless of legislative intent.10 Courts evaluate the “practical
effect” of a statute by considering its direct consequences, its “interact[ion]
with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States,” and the possible
effects if many (or all) states “adopted similar legislation.”11
B. Applying the Extraterritoriality Principle to State
Climate Change Legislation
The extraterritoriality principle has not been applied uniformly across
the courts. The Supreme Court has not provided a clear test to determine
whether a state statute has the “practical effect” of controlling commerce
outside state jurisdiction and has only applied the principle in a limited
number of cases.12 In the context of state-level climate change prevention
policies to reduce instate emissions, the extraterritoriality principle is
potentially ill-suited to address climate change legislation that legitimately
takes into account out-of-state greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted by outof-state generators. This is partially due to the interconnectedness of the
electricity grid across multiple states whereby state regulation of local
electricity markets may impact out-of-state generators connected to that

7. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1176 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
8. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989).
9. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43
(1982) (plurality opinion)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 336–37 (“[T]he Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation
arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another
State.”).
12. North Dakota v. Heydinger (Heydinger II), 825 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2016);
FARBER & CARLARNE, supra note 4, at 195.
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same grid.13 Furthermore, because GHGs mix uniformly in the atmosphere,
state emissions reduction programs may inadvertently amplify emissions
through “leakage,”14 working against the goal of reducing overall GHGs.15
Although the federal government has attempted to promote renewable
energy and carbon-reduction initiatives, it has so far failed to enact
comprehensive legislation that would direct states to develop renewable
energy initiatives.16 As the localized effects of GHG-driven climate change
are felt more acutely, and as federal inaction continues, state governments
have taken up the task of developing energy policies that reduce GHG
emissions in their territory.17 An example of one mechanism employed by
states is the Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which generally requires
electricity suppliers to provide consumers with a certain percentage of
electricity generated from renewable sources.18 A few states have also
developed policies—e.g., Zero-Emissions Credit (ZEC) programs—that
compensate nuclear power plants for the carbon-free electricity they produce.19
Additionally, states have developed regulations targeting emissions from

13. The line between federal and state electricity market control is murky due to the
interconnectedness of the grid and overlapping areas of wholesale and retail electricity;
and federal and state attempts at regulating the wholesale and retail markets, respectively,
have been subject to litigation. See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S.
Ct 1288 (2016) (holding that Maryland’s power program, setting the rate a power company
received for interstate wholesale electricity capacity, intruded on FERC’s authority
to regulate wholesale sales of electricity); see also FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
577 U.S. 260 (2016) (holding a FERC rule aimed at reducing energy prices and pressure
on the grid, although influencing the retail electricity market, did not intruded on state
authority to regulate the retail market); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy
Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE
& ENERGY L. 127, 129 (2014).
14. Carbon “leakage” refers to a situation where the costs related to a jurisdiction’s
climate policies shift industry out of that jurisdiction to one with less stringent controls,
and thus amplifying emissions elsewhere. FARBER & CARLARNE, supra note 4, at 113.
Another carbon leakage mechanism is the “rebound effect,” which generally refers to the
scenario where energy efficiency measures, and any related decrease in energy costs
associated with those measures, cause consumers to increase their energy use, potentially
negating the benefit gained through efficiency measures. Id.
15. See Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1080 (“Because GHGs mix in the
atmosphere, all emissions related to transportation fuels used in California pose the same
local risk to California citizens.”).
16. See Lee & Duane, supra note 5, at 297; Klass & Henley, supra note 13, at 154.
17. See, e.g., Klass & Henley, supra note 13, at 154–55 (discussing state “energy
policy legislation governing fuels, renewable electricity, and programs to more significantly
promote new energy technologies”).
18. FARBER & CARLARNE, supra note 4, at 17.
19. NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., ZERO-EMISSION CREDITS 2 (2018), https://www.nei.org/
corporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/zero-emission-credits-201804.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6W3M-HCBL].
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transportation fuels, and from new coal-fired power plants.20 As a result,
the state climate change policies that have implicated extraterritorial regulation
cover a diverse range of energy sectors, complicating the courts’ application
of extraterritoriality in those cases.
1. Overview of State Climate Change Initiatives Challenged
Under Extraterritoriality
Part II discusses the Ninth Circuit’s upholding of California’s Low
Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) after it was challenged by Midwest ethanol
producers and others as violating the extraterritoriality principle by penalizing
outside emitters for the benefit of California ethanol producers.21 The
court formed its opinion from the central rationale that “California is entitled
to proceed on the understanding that global warming is being induced by
rising carbon emissions and [California can] attempt to change that trend.”22
Thus, California may regulate to address local harms from carbon emissions,
and incentivize out-of-state conduct to help meet in-state clean energy
goals by taking into account any relevant harmful property of that out-ofstate product.23 Any “incidental effects on interstate commerce” are not
per se invalid.24 The court was patently protecting California’s “role as a
leader in developing air-quality standards” and the serious threat to
California’s public health and environment due to climate change.25
Part III discusses the case that followed a couple years later in the Tenth
Circuit involving a Colorado Renewable Energy Standard (RES) Statute’s
provision (referred to as the “Renewables Quota”), requiring utility companies
to provide Colorado electricity consumers with a certain percentage of
electricity from renewable sources. 26 The court in that case limited
extraterritoriality challenges to price-control regulations, “linking in-state
prices to those charged elsewhere,” resulting in “raising costs for out-

20. See Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1070; Heydinger II, 825 F.3d at
912.
21. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1070.
22. Id. at 1090.
23. Id. at 1104 (explaining that some relevant physical properties of ethanol include
those related to location).
24. Id. at 1106.
25. Id. at 1079.
26. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1174.
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of-state consumers or rival businesses.”27 Using this rationale, it was easy
for the court to distinguish the Renewables Quota because it simply regulated
the “quality of a good sold to in-state residents.”28 The effect of the ruling
is that climate change prevention policies subject to Tenth Circuit jurisdiction
will violate the extraterritoriality principle only if it is a transparent price
control or affirmation law.29
Part IV discusses a case decided a year later in the Eighth Circuit on a
Commerce Clause and preemption challenge to two Minnesota’s Next
Generation Energy Act (NGEA) provisions, prohibiting regulated parties
from meeting in-state electrical demand with imports of electricity produced
by new fossil fuel generation, and new long-term power purchase agreements
that would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.30
The statute provided an exception for natural gas electricity producers,
and limited the size of the facilities covered; thus, the statute had the practical
effect of regulating mostly new coal-powered generators.31 Judge Loken,
writing the opinion, found the provisions were an impermissible extraterritorial
reach of Minnesota’s authority because the “broad prohibitions” of the
statute “plainly encompass[ed] non-Minnesota entities and transactions,”
forcing out-of-staters to comply with Minnesota’s law even when transacting
business entirely outside of Minnesota.32 The other two panel members
agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but relied on preemption, not
Commerce Clause, grounds.33
2. Do the Circuit Court Rulings Create Confusion on
Extraterritoriality?
Part V analyzes the resulting discrepancies created by the courts’ application
of extraterritoriality to state climate change prevention policies. Each of
the three statutes at issue in the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit regulated
either a discrete energy sector, or was distinct in its scope. California’s
LCFS regulated transportation fuels blended and sold in California. Colorado’s
RES regulated utility companies purchasing electricity for Colorado electricity
consumers. Minnesota’s NGEA prohibited the importation of certain new
27. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel (Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. II), 793 F.3d 1169,
1173 (10th Cir. 2015).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 1175 (noting the “serious problems of overinclusion” that might cause
well-grounded health and safety regulations be invalidated just because they have the
effect of controlling conduct outside the state).
30. Heydinger II, 825 F.3d at 915.
31. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 3 (2020); see Klass & Henley, supra note 13, at
170.
32. Heydinger II, 825 F.3d at 921.
33. Id. at 923–29.
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fossil fuel-powered electricity and prohibited certain power-purchase
agreements that would contribute to statewide emissions. The shared
attribute of the three statutes was their purpose—i.e., all were state climate
change initiatives promoting renewable energy and targeting the reduction
of GHGs. Yet, California’s LCFS, and Colorado’s RES were upheld as
constitutional, while Minnesota’s NGEA prohibitions were struck down.
Thus, the question is whether the different outcomes in each of the circuits
was due to a difference of circumstance, or a difference of doctrinal
interpretation and application. This Article attempts to: (1) draw out the
specific facts that each court relied upon in determining whether or not
the statute was an impermissible extraterritorial reach of state authority,
and (2) look at the differences in each court’s interpretation and ultimate
application of extraterritoriality to the statute at issue before it.
II. ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION V. COREY
A. California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS)
California’s Air Resource Board (CARB) promulgated regulations
pursuant to California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (also referred
to as “AB 32”), which recognized the palpable threat global warming
posed to the State’s economy, environment, and public health.34 The Low
Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) was one measure adopted by the CARB
pursuant to AB 32, which addressed GHGs emitted in the production and
transportation of transportation fuels (referred to as “embedded” GHGs).35
CARB used a lifecycle analysis to determine a “carbon intensity” value
based upon the embedded GHGs of ethanol destined to be blended, sold,
and consumed in California.36 The lifecycle analysis took into account
emissions associated with all aspects of ethanol production including (1)
crop growth (typically corn or sugar); (2) the electricity type and efficiency
used during processing (e.g., coal, hydroelectricity, or natural gas); and

34. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1079.
35. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene (Rocky Mountain Farmers I), 843
F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079–81 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (addressing provisions regarding ethanol, crude
oil and its derivatives).
36. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1080–81 (assigning lifecycle values
using a carbon intensity value).
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(3) all transportation.37 California also imports certain feedstock for local
ethanol refining and blending.38 Regulated entities could comply with the
LCFS either by relying on a “default pathway”—a known pathway with
a predesignated carbon intensity—or by registering an individualized
pathway, which would calculate the pathway’s carbon intensity using
listed formulas.39
The LCFS also created a cap-and-trade system with a declining annual
carbon intensity cap on transportation fuels sold and consumed in California.40
This market-based system was intended to “stimulate and [sic] the production
and use of alternative, low-carbon fuels in California,” with the benefit of
decreasing California’s dependence on petroleum.41
Both the ethanol and crude oil provisions were challenged by a collective
of industry groups, arguing that the LCFS impermissibly discriminated
against out-of-state corn ethanol, regulated extraterritorially, and excessively
burdened interstate commerce without producing any local benefit.42
B. District Court Holds the LCFS is an Impermissible
Extraterritorial Reach
The district court found that California’s LCFS had an impermissible
extraterritorial reach because the method of assigning carbon intensity
values based upon different geographic areas—or factors which depended
upon location—penalized regulated parties for outside conduct, having
the “practical effect” of controlling conduct beyond the borders of
California.43

37. Id. at Appx. 2; see id. at 1081–82 (explaining the lifecycle analysis is built upon
the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation Model
(GREET)).
38. Id. at 1083.
39. Id. at 1082. In 2015, a new revision of the LCFS replaced the original 2011
LCFS and its 2012 amendments, effectively removing the default pathways that were
based upon regional characteristics while leaving the other aspects of the LCFS essentially
unchanged. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (Rocky Mountain Farmers III), 913
F.3d 940, 946–47 (9th Cir. 2019).
40. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1080 (explaining regulated parties
selling ethanol in California generated credits or deficits depending on whether its carbon
intensity was less than or above the cap).
41. Rocky Mountain Farmers I, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
42. Id. at 1079 (challenging the LCFS on the grounds that it is preempted by the
EISA).
43. Id. at 1091–92 (stating that regulating “wholly” out-of-state conduct refers to
regulating conduct between out-of-state producers in transactions to which California is
not a party).
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After finding the lifecycle analysis approach to GHGs amounted to an
impermissible extraterritorial reach, the court applied strict scrutiny and
struck down the statute.44
1. The Consequences of the LCFS on Out-of-State Ethanol Producers
CARB conceded that the purpose of assigning carbon intensity values
to ethanol pathways using the lifecycle analysis was to give an “incentive
for regulated parties to adopt production methods which result in lower
emissions.”45 Meaning, both in-state and out-of-state pathways with high
carbon intensity practices (e.g., long transportation routes, high-emissions
power sources such as coal, and inefficient land use) were more likely to
fall above the LCFS market cap, incurring deficits that must be made up
for with credits.46
The court held that California could not take “legal and political
responsibility” for commerce occurring wholly outside its borders, regardless
of whether those products were consumed in California.47 The LCFS
“impermissibly regulate[d] the channels of interstate commerce” because
the method of generating credits, requiring a regulated party to get approval
by the CARB, forced parties to “seek regulatory approval in [California]
before undertaking a transaction in another.”48
2. The LCFS Risks the Economic Balkanization of the Electricity Market
The court considered the interaction of the LCFS with the regulatory
regimes of other states, and the possible effects of multi-state adoption of
similar legislation.49 The court held that the LCFS was an impermissible
reach of California’s regulatory authority because the possible inconsistent
legislation from state to state arising from a wide-spread adoption of
similar LCFS regulations would cause significant hardships to producers
attempting to satisfy multiple different GHG reduction levels in many

44. Id. at 1093–94.
45. Id. at 1091 (quoting CARB Final Statement of Reasons (FSOR) at 84).
46. Id. at 1080, 1091 (determining this amounted to penalizing out-of-state ethanol
production practices).
47. Id. at 1092–93.
48. Id. at 1092 (quoting Brown-Forman Distiller Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986)).
49. Id. at 1090–92.
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different markets.50 Also, different regulatory regimes risked fragmenting
the national ethanol market into competing state-run markets.51
After finding the LCFS in violation of the Commerce Clause’s prohibition
on extraterritorial regulation (as well as finding facial discrimination), the
statute could not survive strict scrutiny because California had failed to
prove that its legitimate purpose of reducing GHG emissions could not be
served through alternative, nondiscriminatory means.52
In its discrimination analysis, the court focused on the LCFS lifecycle
analysis’ differentiation of ethanol pathways, assigning carbon intensity
values based on geographical regions, transportation distances, and factors
tied to location.53 Regardless of origin-related lifecycle factors that benefit
out-of-state ethanol producers, the price difference of chemically-identical
ethanol in the California market would be based upon origin—and that
amounted to discrimination. Piggy-backing on this analysis, the court
turned to the issue of extraterritorially.54 The court held that the lifecycle
analysis, as described, “attempt[ed] to account for-and reduce-emissions
from the entire pathway,” and amounted to “penalizing” the practices of
other states.55
C. Ninth Circuit Overturns District Court Application of the
Extraterritoriality Principle
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with the standard, recognized in
Massachusetts v. EPA, that climate change poses a legitimate local threat

50. Id. at 1092–93.
51. Id. (explaining the Commerce Clause is meant to prevent this sort of economic
balkanization).
52. Id. at 1093 (agreeing that California’s LCFS served a “legitimate and local”
interest).
53. Id. at 1086–88. Regardless of origin, ethanol sold in California has the same
physical and chemical properties; thus, the carbon intensity values for producers with the
same feedstock and processing can only be distinguished by origin-specific factors.
Despite the fact that the lifecycle analysis is a scientific formula uniformly applied to all
ethanol pathways, the court confusingly separated the lifecycle factors into those based on
origin, and those not (like feedstock and production process), and then determined the only
relevant comparison was pathways with identical feedstock and production processes, and
then asked why those two pathways produced identical ethanol with different carbon
intensities (and price) by the time they enter the California ethanol market—of course, the
only comparison left is origin-based differences. Under this reasoning, Brazilian ethanol—
with a lower carbon intensity than some California pathways—was entirely removed from
the court’s analysis since it is made from sugarcane, vice corn.
54. Id. at 1091 (stating that “[o]stensibly, the LCFS regulates only fuel-providers
in California”).
55. Id. (explaining that this “penalizing” had the practical effect of controlling wholly
out-of-state conduct).
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to states.56 The court found that because California’s legislature determined
California faces “tremendous risk” from climate change, and GHG emissions
from transportation fuels contribute to that risk, it was permissible for
California to regulate to reduce that risk using a market-based solution.57
The court therefore found it appropriate that the lifecycle analysis took
into account the “real extent of GHG emissions.”58 The court stressed that
the principles of federalism should protect states serving as “laborator[ies]
for innovation.”59 Any incidental effects on interstate commerce arising
from that constitutional exercise could be analyzed under Pike, a standard
of scrutiny a state statute is more likely to survive.60
1. Discrimination Based on Origin, with a Sense of
Extraterritorial Reach
Discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause “simply means
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter.” 61 This analysis assumes the
“comparison of substantially similar entities.”62
The court emphasized the importance of examining ethanol pathways
for discrimination using the carbon intensity values which take into account
all lifecycle factors. 63 Meaning, that if California “assign[ed] different
carbon intensities to ethanol from different regions, there must be some
reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”64 And although
California assigned higher carbon intensities to certain pathways, California
did not “base its treatment on a fuel’s origin but on its carbon intensity,”

56. 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007); Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1080.
57. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1106.
58. Id. at 1107 (explaining that the “real extent” necessarily included emissions by
out-of-state producers).
59. Id. at 1079 (quoting Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F. 2d 1095, 1111)).
60. Id. at 1106.
61. Id. at 1087 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99).
62. Id. at 1087–88 (explaining that entities are substantially similar for constitutional
purposes “if their products compete against each other in a single market.”) (quoting Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997)).
63. Id. at 1088–89 (explaining that a full understanding of the carbon intensity value
of each pathway is crucial to determining whether the LCFS discriminates against out-ofstate ethanol pathways).
64. Id. at 1089 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)) (internal
quotations omitted) (explaining that assigning different carbon intensity values to ethanol
pathways from different regions does not automatically equate to discrimination).
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considering location “only to the extent” it affected lifecycle factors.65 In
other words, California did not discriminate against out-of-state ethanol
producers by assigning pathways different carbon intensity values for the
purpose of conducting the lifecycle analysis.
The court found that the lower court erred when it held that lifecycle
factors correlated with origin, like transportation and electricity type, were
“impermissible under the dormant Commerce Clause.”66 The district court
also erred in concluding that Brazilian ethanol pathways were unsuitable
for comparison with other Midwest and California ethanol pathways.67
The court reasoned that all ethanol pathways to California result in
chemically-identical ethanol being “blended” in California and, thus, are
in close competition with each other in a single ethanol market.68
2. The LCFS is not an Impermissible Extraterritorial Reach and
Incidental Effects on Interstate Commerce Should be
Examined Under Pike Balancing
The court rejected the district court’s application of the extraterritoriality
principle and disagreed that the LCFS was an attempt by California to
“regulate[] the channels of interstate commerce,” or to control wholly outof-state conduct. 69 The court held that the LCFS did not have an
impermissible extraterritorial reach because it had only incidental effects
on interstate commerce, and sought only to influence, not control, out-ofstate behavior.70 The court reasoned that the LCFS does not require any
out-of-state producer to adopt “reciprocal standards” before selling ethanol in
California.71 Additionally, the market-based system of credits and caps set
up by the LCFS applied “only to the portfolios of fuel blenders in California
and the producers who contract with them.” 72 Essentially, states may
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1090.
67. Id. at 1088
68. Id. at 108–89 (explaining that by excluding origin-specific lifecycle factors from
comparison, the district court essentially labeled those factors “ungrounded presumption[s] that
unfairly prejudice out-of-state ethanol,” when, in reality, each origin-specific factor is “an
average based on scientific data”).
69. Id. at 1101.
70. Id. at 1103 (reasoning that the LCFS regulated only the California market, providing
incentives to producers wishing to do business in the California ethanol market—without
requiring any certain conduct).
71. Id. at 1103–04 (explaining that the LCFS imposes no fines or penalties for any
out-of-state behavior, but rather incentivizes producers to voluntarily adopt low-carbon
intensity methods in order to be competitive in the California ethanol market).
72. Id. at 1103 (explaining that an impermissible extraterritorial reach of a state’s
authority must be an attempt to control wholly out-of-state behavior, such as a state’s
mandating “compliance with their preferred policies in wholly out-of-state transactions”).
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address local harms by encouraging certain behavior within their borders
using market incentives without running afoul of the extraterritoriality
principle. The court, in a later opinion affirming the constitutionality of
the 2015 version of the LCFS, distinguished state statutes that regulate
out-of-state parties to those where at least one party in the contractual
relationship is located in the state;73 The former being an impermissible
extraterritorial reach and the later a valid exercise of state authority to
influence market behavior.74
The court addressed the balkanizing effects of the LCFS as an
“alternative basis” to extraterritorial regulation.75 As the court points out
previously in the opinion, this analysis is actually part of determining the
“practical effect” of a statute under the extraterritoriality principle.76 Since
the balkanization effects of the LCFS are relevant to a discussion of
whether it is impermissible extraterritorial regulation, the court dismissed
the district court’s concern that widespread adoption would cause
hardships for out-of-state ethanol producers by forcing them to move to
the “State of largest use,” sell only locally, or create inconsistent regulations
impossible for individual producers to satisfy.77 If every state regulated
only fuels consumed within its borders, it “would not create the interlocking
problems of cross-border price setting or out-of-state approval” that the
extraterritorially principle prohibits.78
III. ENERGY & ENV’T LEGAL INST. V. EPEL
A. Colorado’s Renewable Energy Standard (RES) Statute
Colorado’s Renewable Energy Standard (RES) Statute and its implementing
regulations were challenged by a non-profit energy and environmental
organization (The Energy and Environmental Legal Institute) and others
for violating the Commerce Clause.79 The RES Statute was the result of a
73. Rocky Mountain Farmers III, 913 F.3d at 952.
74. Id.
75. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1104.
76. Id. at 1101.
77. Id. at 1104 (explaining that the widespread adoption of similar LCFS statutes
by other states would harmonize states’ goals of promoting low-carbon intensity fuels).
78. Id. at 1105 (explaining that the concerns were unfounded because the LCFS did
not exclude any fuel from entering the in-state market, charge out-of-state producers
inappropriate fees to enter the in-state market, attempt to control other states fuel markets,
or cause other states to “peg [their] fuel prices or regulatory standards to those of another”).
79. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1173–74.
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2004 vote by Colorado Citizens “intend[ing] to promote the development
and utilization of renewable energy resources.”80 The provisions at issue
were collectively referred to as the “Renewables Quota” that required, as
amended, “each retail utility to generate, or cause to be generated, renewable
energy resources in specified minimum amounts.”81 Regulated utilities
could meet their quota by generating electricity using renewable sources,
purchasing electricity generated by renewable energy, or purchasing renewable
energy credits.82 Regulated utilities had to seek approval from Colorado’s
Public Utility Commission (PUC) to use renewable energy and energy
credits towards their quota. Certain utilities were required to submit to the
PUC, and receive approval of, detailed compliance plans.83
The basis of the challenge was that the Renewables Quota would cause
out-of-state, coal-fired electricity generators to lose business with other
out-of-state utilities that provide electricity to the regional grid.84 This was
due to the interconnectedness of the regional grid of which Colorado is
member state, and the fact that Colorado is a net importer of electricity.85
B. District Court Holds the Renewables Quota is Not an
Impermissible Extraterritorial Reach
The Renewables Quota was challenged under the theory that it restricted
the manufacturing of out-of-state goods by requiring “out-of-state electricity
to be generated according to Colorado’s terms.” 86 The court disagreed,
finding that the Renewables Quota governed only Colorado utilities in
Colorado transactions.87 The court addressed federalism concerns, like the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers II, and was unwilling to
invalidate a state statute simply because it differed from other states or

80. Id. at 1174.
81. Id. (explaining that the Renewables Quota required investor-owned utilities to
purchase thirty percent of its retail electricity from renewables, certain cooperative
electric associations to purchase twenty percent of its electricity from renewables, and
other cooperative electric associations and large municipal utilities to purchase ten percent
of their retail electricity from renewables, by 2020).
82. Id. at 1175 (explaining that renewable sources that could be credited to the quota
included re-captured energy generated by the “heat from exhaust stacks or pipes,” solar,
wind, geothermal, biomass, and “hydroelectricity with certain restrictions”).
83. Id.
84. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. II, 793 F.3d at 1171.
85. Id. (explaining that the interconnected grid serves multiple states and portions
of Canada and Mexico).
86. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1179. (“Plaintiffs contend that
the Renewables Quota is a ‘mandate’ which requires energy produced wholly out-of-state
to comply with Colorado-approved methods for renewable energy.”).
87. Id. at 1181–82.
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incentivized certain out-of-state behavior.88 The Renewables Quota survived
the Pike balancing test because it likely burdened in-state and out-of-state
entities equally, if at all.89
1. The Renewables Quota Does Not Have the Practical Effect of
Controlling Wholly Out-of-state Commerce
The district court narrowly construed conduct that amounted to controlling
“wholly” out-of-state commerce. Specifically, when Colorado regulated
both in-state electricity generators and also transactions between out-ofstate and in-state entities, it did not regulate “wholly” extraterritorial
commerce.90 The court took a similar stance as the Ninth Circuit, finding
incidental effects on interstate commerce arising from legitimate in-state
regulatory schemes meant to incentivize out-of-state behavior not invalid
per se.91
The court’s reasoning is straightforward: the RES did not impact
transactions conducted entirely out of state.92 It regulated Colorado electricity
generators and out-of-state generators entering into transactions with
Colorado utilities.93 Interstate commerce was not affected “unless and
until an out-of-state electricity generator freely [chose] to do business”
with Colorado.94 Out-of-state generators were not required to change any
conduct because of the statute.95 The RES did not place conditions on
electricity imported into Colorado, affecting out-of-state generators only
to the extent Colorado utilities could count the electricity towards its
Renewables Quota.96 The RES may negatively impact both in-state and
out-of-state non-renewable electrical generators—but such an impact did
88. Id. at 1180 (“[T]he fact that the RES may provide an incentive for out-of-state
companies to conduct their business in a manner that complies with Colorado’s renewable
energy standards also does not make the statute improper.”).
89. Id. 1181–84.
90. Id. at 1179, 1181 (explaining that the “RES does not control any aspect of a
transaction between two out-of-state entities”).
91. See id. at 1180 (“[T]he fact that [the Renewables Quota’s] incentive structure
may negatively impact the profits of out-of-state generators whose electricity cannot be
used to fulfil the Quota does not make the Renewables Quota invalid.”).
92. Id. at 1179.
93. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124; Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1174–
75, 1179.
94. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1180.
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not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.97 The RES did not interfere
with other state regulatory regimes, nor disrupt any perceived need for
uniformity in the market.98
2. The Renewables Quota Burdens All Generators
Equally, or Not at All
Using the Pike balancing test, the court turned to the issue of whether
the impact that the Renewables Quota did have on interstate commerce
nevertheless invalidated the statute.99 The Renewables Quota satisfied the
Pike balancing test because the challengers “failed to show that the RES
burdens interstate commerce at all, much less that any such burden is
clearly excessive in relation to the benefits conferred on the state by the
RES.”100
The court used four factors to determine whether the Renewables Quota
failed the Pike balancing test: “(1) the burden on interstate commerce; (2)
the nature of the putative benefits conferred by the statute; (3) whether the
burden is ‘clearly excessive in relation to’ local interests; and (4) whether
the local interests can be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
commerce.”101 The Renewables Quota did not make it more difficult for
electricity to be produced and transmitted to and from states interconnected
through the grid.102 The fact that the Renewables Quota caused Colorado
utilities to shift to purchasing renewable energy did not invalidate an
“otherwise valid regulation.”103
The scope of the Pike balancing test is not the focus of this Article. But,
the factors that the court took into account when conducting its analysis
under Pike read as a continuum of the analysis done under the extraterritoriality
principle. In other words, the rationales for upholding the Renewables Quota
under extraterritoriality and Pike overlapped. For example, applying Pike,
the court reasoned that the lack of uniformity in state regulation of the
electricity market did not excessively burden interstate commerce. 104
This same reasoning was also used in the court’s application of the
extraterritoriality principle in determining that the Renewables Quota
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1181.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1184.
101. Id. at 1182 (quoting Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 27 F.3d
1499, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994)).
102. Id. (explaining that any burden that the Renewables Quota might have on nonrenewable electricity producers would be felt the same by in-state and out-of-state generators).
103. Id. at 1183 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127
(1978)).
104. Id. at 1182.
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did not have the “practical effect” of controlling conduct wholly out of
state because the Plaintiffs hadn’t “demonstrate[ed] that there exists such
a compelling need for uniformity in the market for renewable energy credits
that having a system of different or even inconsistent state regulations is
unworkable.”105
C. The Tenth Circuit Limits the Extraterritoriality Principle to
Price-control Statutes
The only issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Renewables Quota
violated the dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition against extraterritorial
regulation.106 The opinion, written by Justice Gorsuch while he served
on the Tenth Circuit, took up the issue of whether the Renewables Quota,
requiring in-state utilities to purchase a percentage of the electricity meant
for in-state sales from renewable electricity generators, violated “the most
dormant doctrine in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”107
The court, citing the three Supreme Court cases where a state statute
was struck down using the extraterritorial principle, determined that those
cases involved only price-control or price-affirmation statutes linking instate and out-of-state prices, and had the effect of “raising costs for outof-state consumers or rival businesses.”108 The court distinguished the
RES, determining it was more akin to a “quality of good[s]” mandate than
a price-control statute because it required utilities to purchase a certain
type of product.109 The court accepted that even quality control regulations
might ultimately affect prices in-state and out-of-state. Thus, while the
effect of a statute might be to link in-state and out-of-state prices, or raise
prices for out-of-staters, “without a regulation more blatantly regulating

105. Id. at 1181–82.
106. See id. (noting that the Plaintiffs did not appeal the lower court's determination
that the Renewables Quota did not discriminate against interstate commerce or excessively
burden interstate commerce).
107. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. II, 793 F.3d. at 1170.
108. Id. at 1172–73 (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935),
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986),
and Healy, 491 U.S. 324 (1989)).
109. Id. at 1173 (explaining further that the Renewables Quota did not link the price
paid for electricity by Colorado consumers to prices paid for electricity by out-of-state
consumers).
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price and discriminating against out-of-state consumers or producers,”
those effects are not sufficient to trigger per se invalidation.110
In its extraterritoriality analysis, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the
Renewables Quota did not discriminate against out-of-staters.111 This
exemplifies the blurry distinction between a statute that discriminates and
one that impermissibly regulates extraterritorially—i.e., whether a law
discriminates against out-of-staters is arguably a separate test from
extraterritoriality. But, the issues of whether the Renewables Quota
discriminated against interstate commerce or excessively burdened interstate
commerce under Pike were not appealed, and so the Tenth Circuit never
reached either issue. However, the court did say that state statutes regulating
“non-price standards for products sold in-state,” such as Colorado’s RES,
“may be amenable to scrutiny under the generally applicable Pike
balancing test, or scrutinized for traces of discrimination.”112
Interestingly, the district court, in its extraterritoriality analysis, cited a
non-price control statute struck down in Edgar v. MITE Corp.113 In that
case, an Illinois statute required any takeover offer for shares of a target
company to submit offers to the Secretary of State of Illinois, including
situations where the target company was neither incorporated or headquartered
in Illinois.114 The statute was challenged on preemption and Commerce
Clause grounds, and while the court did not reach a majority decision on
the preemption issue, it struck down the statute on Commerce Clause
grounds.115 Part V-A of the opinion, analyzing the extraterritorial effects
of the Illinois statute, was a plurality opinion.116 In Part V-A, Justice
White, joined by Justices Burger, Stevens, and O’Conner, found the Illinois
statute had a “sweeping extraterritorial effect” because the statute could
apply to a tender offer by a foreign corporation that would not implicate
Illinois shareholders at all.117 Thus, it had the effect of directly regulating
“wholly” out-of-state transactions across state lines.118 Additionally, the
110. Id. at 1173–74.
111. Id. at 1173.
112. Id.
113. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
114. Id. at 627 (defining a target company as “a corporation or other issuer of
securities of which shareholders located in Illinois own ten percent of the class of equity
securities subject to the offer, or for which any two of the following three conditions are
met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under the
laws of Illinois, or has at least ten percent of its state capital and paid-in surplus represented
within the state”).
115. Id. at 626, 640.
116. Id. at 643. The majority opinion, however, did hold that the statute was in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause under Pike (Part V-B of the opinion).
117. Id. at 642.
118. Id. at 643.
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court held that the effect of states other than Illinois adopting similar
legislation would be to “thoroughly stifle[]” interstate commerce in securities
transactions.119
The Tenth Circuit, however, declined to adopt Edgar’s extraterritoriality
analysis in its opinion, instead relying on cases involving instances of
“naked price fixing” by state regulations or “something else experience
teaches to be clearly invidious.” 120 In other words, unlike the Ninth or
Eighth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit effectively limited the applicability of
the extraterritoriality principle to price-control or price-affirmation statutes.
IV. NORTH DAKOTA V. HEYDINGER
A. Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act (NGEA)
Passed in 2007, the Next Generation Energy Act (NGEA) established
energy standards aimed at reducing “statewide [GHG] emissions across
all sectors producing those emissions.”121 Specifically at issue were the
related provisions aimed at limiting increases in “statewide power sector
carbon dioxide emissions.” 122 Statewide power sector carbon dioxide
emissions included total annual carbon dioxide emissions from in-state
power generators, and emissions from out-of-state electricity generation
imported and consumed in the state.123 The provisions provided that on or
after August 1, 2009, no person shall: (1) construct in-state new large electricity
facilities, (2) import or commitment to import electricity from new large
out-of-state generators, or (3) enter into “new long-term power purchase
agreement[s]” that would contribute to statewide carbon dioxide emissions.124
Because of the exception for natural gas-fired generators, and a limit on
the capacity of regulated power plants (facilities with a combined capacity
of less than 100 megawatts were excepted), the practical effect of the law
was to limit its applicability to new coal-fired plants in Minnesota built
after 2007, and out-of-state coal-fired plants built after 2007 that wanted

119. Id. at 642.
120. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. II, 793 F.3d at 1174.
121. MINN. STAT. § 216H.02, subd. 1 (2007). The levels sought were “at least fifteen
percent below 2005 levels by 2015, to a level at least thirty percent below 2005 levels by
2025, and to a level at least eighty percent below 2005 levels by 2050.” Id.
122. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 3.
123. North Dakota v. Heydinger (Heydinger I), 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 898 (D. Minn. 2014).
124. Id. at 897–98 (explaining that a “long-term power purchase agreement” is “an
agreement to purchase [fifty MW] of capacity or more for a term exceeding five years”).
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to import electricity for consumption in Minnesota. 125 Violators (and
potential violators) were subject to legal action, as determined by the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) and Minnesota Department of
Commerce (MDOC).126 The NGEA created an offset exemption, allowing
regulated parties to show that contributions to statewide emissions would
be offset by a carbon dioxide reduction project.127
A myriad of out-of-state actors, including the State of North Dakota, the
North Dakota lignite coal industry, and at least one in-state rural electric
cooperative, challenged the Minnesota Statute on constitutional and preemption
grounds.128
B. District Court Holds the NGEA Overreaches and Risks
Balkanizing the Electricity Market
Initially, the court addressed the scope of the statute due to the disagreement
between the parties as to the interpretation of the phrases “no person
shall,” “import or commit to import,” and “new long-term power purchase
agreement.”129 The defendants to the action, the MPUC and MDOC, argued
the court should construe the statutory language as narrowly as possible
since it was “unambiguous” in that it “merely regulate[d] the sources of
power that Minnesota utilities can rely upon to meet the needs of their
customers.”130 Declining to adopt that interpretation, the court determined
that (1) the statute applied to “all persons” in-state and out-of-state, to all
transmissions through the regional grid (the Midcontinent Independent
System Operator, hereinafter “MISO”), and (2) that the long-term power

125. Id. at 898–99 (noting that other exceptions were made for new, large energy
facilities proposed prior to the NGEA, certain power purchase contracts entered into
prior to the NGEA, certain essential new large energy facilities or power purchase
agreements); Klass & Henley, supra note 13, at 170.
126. Id. at 898.
127. Id. (noting carbon dioxide reduction projects offset carbon dioxide emissions
either by reducing an “existing facilities contribution to [regulated emissions],” or by purchasing
carbon dioxide allowances in a verified cap-and-trade program).
128. Id. at 902, 915–16. Plaintiffs argued that the statute had the “objective of
reducing carbon dioxide emission regardless of where they occur,” required “merchants
to seek regulatory approval in Minnesota before undertaking transactions in other states,”
risked balkanization, and regulated transactions between out-of-state entities.
129. Id. at 908–09 (explaining that the scope of the statute was relevant to finding on
the constitutional claim).
130. Id. (arguing that because a buyer in the regional grid cannot know the
actual source of the electricity, it cannot “import or commit to import” power from any
source.” Thus, it would be “impossible to apply” the statute’s provisions to any other entity
than Minnesota utilities purchasing electricity for consumption in Minnesota . The
defendants point out that the regional market sales are for short-term, not long-term energy
agreements and do not “implicate the long-term power purchase agreement provisions.”).
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agreements were for capacity, and not energy that is “ultimately bid into
the MISO market.”131
With that broad interpretation, the court then held that the Minnesota
statute provisions prohibiting electricity imports from new large energy
facilities built outside the state and prohibiting regulated entities from entering
into long-term power purchase agreements for capacity that would contribute
to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions violated the extraterritoriality
principle, and were per se invalid.132 The court declined to limit the principle
to price control regulations.133
The court called the provisions a “classic example of extraterritorial
regulation” in the context of the interconnected electricity market.134 The
court focused heavily on the “boundary-less nature” of the MISO grid in
its opinion.135 The court analogized the transmission of electricity through
an interconnection to that of information flow over the internet. 136
Specifically, like the internet, a region’s electricity grid is boundary-less.
Meaning, non-Minnesota generators transmitting electricity on the MISO
grid (even to satisfy the electricity demand of non-Minnesota members)
could not guarantee that electricity would not be “imported to and contribute
to” carbon dioxide emissions in Minnesota.137 Essentially, this forced outof-state entities seeking to do business within the MISO grid, but outside
Minnesota, to “conduct their out-of-state business according to Minnesota’s
terms.”138 The court goes on to posture that such a regulatory regime, if
131. Id. at 895–910. MISO is a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), designated
by FERC, and responsible for coordinating, monitoring, and administering the transmission of
energy on the regional electricity grid.
132. Id. (analyzing the “practical effect” of the provisions by looking at their
consequences, interaction with other states’ statutes, and the risk of the adoption of a similar
statute by many or all other states).
133. Id. at 911 (citing, among others, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 475 U.S. at 642–43).
134. Id. at 916.
135. Id. at 917.
136. Id. (analogizing the instant case to that of Am. Booksellers Found. V. Dean,
342 F.3d 96, 103–04 (2003), which struck down internet-use regulations under dormant
Commerce Clause grounds because the boundary-less nature of the internet meant the
Vermont statute projected its regulation into the jurisdiction of other states, thus creating
inconsistent legislation that the Commerce Clause is meant to prohibit).
137. Id. Two non-Minnesota entities entering into long-term capacity agreements in
the MISO market cannot ensure that the electricity produced and transmitted through the
grid will not be consumed in Minnesota.
138. Id. at 901, 918. One of the out-of-state plaintiffs, Basin Electric Power Cooperative,
sought approval from the MPUC to provide coal-fired electricity to its North Dakota
customers because it did not know if the NGEA would prohibit the move. Basin Electric
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adopted by other states, would bring the electricity market “to a grinding
halt.”139
C. Eighth Circuit Upholds with One of Three Judges Affirming
Commerce Clause Grounds
The three-judge panel on appeal to the Eighth Circuit separately
concluded that the NGEA provisions were invalid. Judge Loken, who
authored the opinion, agreed that the statute impermissibly regulated
extraterritorially.140 Explaining that the “presumption against extraterritoriality
does not apply when the statute’s text is clear,” the opinion goes on
to reiterate and affirm the district court’s holding, including declining to
limit extraterritoriality to price-control or price-affirmation laws.141 Judge
Loken found the challenged provisions to have the effect of regulating
non-Minnesota importers and generators of electricity in transactions “wholly”
outside of Minnesota because those entities “injecting electricity into the
MISO grid” cannot be certain that electricity will not be consumed in
Minnesota; thus, out-of-state entities conducting entirely out-of-state business
are forced to either “unplug” from the MISO market or seek regulatory
approval in Minnesota prior to engaging in interstate commerce.142
However, Judge Murphy disagreed with Judge Loken’s application of
the extraterritoriality principle.143 She pointed out that the electricity grid
“behaves as an undifferentiated electromagnetic wave.”144 Specifically,
electrons do not “flow” from one connection on the grid to another. Generators
effectively energize the grid, and consumers simply draw indiscriminate
power from the grid.145 Thus, the statute could not possibly mean to regulate
the flow of electrons from certain generators to Minnesota consumers,

was also stalling on entering into long-term power purchase agreements in other MISO
market states out of concern for violating Minnesota’s statute).
139. Id. at 918 (stating that the statute-provided exemption for a “carbon dioxide
reduction project” approved by the MPUC had the effect of requiring out-of-state entities
to get approval from Minnesota before “inject[ing] coal-generated electricity into the MISO
grid to serve its [out-of-state] members.” This exemption, combined with the provisions
requiring in-state utilities to purchase a certain amount of electricity from certain sources,
if adopted by many other states, would create a patchwork of regulations applicable to the
same regional electricity market).
140. Heydinger II, 825 F.3d at 919–21.
141. Id. at 921.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 923 (J. Murphy, concurring in part).
144. Id. at 924.
145. Id.
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rendering Judge Loken’s interpretation implausible.146 In her opinion, and
with that understanding of the grid in mind, the NGEA applied only when
non-Minnesota entities transacted to import electricity into Minnesota, or
enter in long-term power purchase agreements to import electricity into
Minnesota—actions which would not implicate extraterritorial regulation.147
She would have invalidated the provisions as preempted by the Federal
Power Act (FPA) because it regulated wholesale electricity, an area solely
regulated by the FERC.148
Judge Colloton, on the other hand, would have invalidated the NGEA
as preempted under the Clean Air Act provision that calls for states to
regulate in-state stationary sources.149 In his analysis, the offset provisions
“encroach[ed] on the source State’s authority to govern emission from
sources within its borders.”150 Thus, only one of the three Eighth Circuit
panel members invalidated the provisions on the grounds of impermissible
extraterritorial regulation.
V. CONFUSION ON THE CIRCUITS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH
A. Fact Patterns Distinguishable by Scope but Show Similar Purpose
The state laws at issue in California, Colorado, and Minnesota regulated
different energy sectors utilizing different mechanisms. But what these
distinct laws have in common may be more important than what separates
them. For instance, the LCFS and RES were determined to apply only to
fuel blenders selling ethanol in California, and Colorado utilities providing
electricity to Colorado consumers, respectively, i.e., in-state activities and
contractual relationships where one of the parties was located in the state.
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota’s NGEA language
plainly encompassed out-of-state entities and entirely out-of-state transactions.
But, what each of the three share is the fact that they impact some out-of146. Id. (discussing that “in interpreting a Minnesota statute we presume that the
legislature did not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”)
(internal quotations omitted).
147. Id. at 923. (stating that the NGEA regulates out-of-state entities only when doing
business with Minnesota, which does not equate to regulating wholly out-of-state transactions).
148. Id. at 926–27 (explaining that the import provision essentially bans wholesale
sales in interstate commerce).
149. Id. at 927–28 (J. Colton, dissenting) (agreeing also with Judge Murphy’s opinion
that the statute was preempted by the FPA because the statute banned wholesale sales of
electricity, an area of exclusive FERC authority.)
150. Id. at 928–29.
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state conduct for the purpose of promoting renewable energy and GHG
reductions. Specifically, all three statutes recognized the contribution of
out-of-state emissions to the harm felt in their territories, and attempted to
take into account those emissions in their respective policies.
The goal of California’s LCFS was to reduce transportation fuel emissions
that result from the growth, production, and transportation of ethanol
imported, blended, and sold in California. The Plaintiffs argued that the
undifferentiated chemical and physical properties of ethanol prohibited
California from assigning more favorable carbon intensity values to different
pathways, i.e., the different values could only be based on location, an
illegitimate regulatory mechanism.151 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding
that California appropriately grounded its rationale in the “harmful properties
of fuel.”152 In the context of California’s ethanol market, the local harm
felt was the effects associated with GHGs.153 The harmful properties of
ethanol are not solely in its burning (consumption) in the State. Meaning,
regardless of the identical chemical and physical properties of the ethanol
consumed in California, the harmful properties of ethanol include those
GHGs associated with its production and transportation.154 Thus, California
accurately took into account the “real extent” of emissions associated with
its ethanol market.155
Colorado’s more “traditional” RES statute required certain utility companies
to provide Colorado consumers with a specified percentage of electricity
from renewable sources. The Plaintiffs challenged the physical structure
of the regional grid, shared by Colorado and other jurisdictions, which
allows the free flow of energy anywhere on that grid. They argued that
Colorado’s RES would have the effect of decreasing demand for coalfired power generation, causing out-of-state coal producers to lose business
with out-of-state coal-powered generators connected to the grid.156 The
Tenth Circuit held that regardless of the fact that coal producers may see
a decrease in demand for their product, the Renewables Quota did not
regulate the grid, and its impact on the grid—and thus out-of-state producers
and consumers—was “far from obviously negative,” if existing at all.157
Additionally, the court focused on the distinction between quality-of-

151. Rocky Mountain Farmers I, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
152. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1104.
153. Id. at 1079.
154. Id. at 1081 (discussing that without the lifecycle analysis, GHGs associated with
production would be excluded from California’s regulation, ignoring the actual benefits of
ethanol, “which mostly come before combustion”).
155. See id. at 1107.
156. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. II, 793 F.3d at 1171.
157. Id. at 1174.
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goods standards and price-control standards, firmly placing Colorado’s
RES in the former category.
Minnesota’s NGEA was similar to Colorado’s RES in the respect that
it attempted to promote renewable energy sources of electricity, but
instead of requiring utilities to purchase a certain percentage of electricity
from renewables, it prohibited the importation of electricity from new
coal-powered generators. Again, the basis of the challenge was due in part
to the interconnectedness of the grid. Except that in this case, in addition
to the judicial construct of the language “no person shall” to apply to nonMinnesota entities, the physical structure of the regional grid contributed
to the demise of the importation prohibition and long-term power purchase
agreement provisions. Specifically, Judge Loken determined that because
of the unregulated flow of electricity in a regional power grid, out-of-state
generators could not be certain the electricity they fed to the grid to meet
the demand of out-of-state customers would not be consumed in Minnesota,
forcing them to seek regulatory approval in Minnesota prior to conducting
business wholly outside the state.158
B. Comparing Extraterritoriality Application on the Circuits
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits expressed concern with trampling on the
federalism principles that encourage states to experiment in developing
innovative regulatory regimes, especially those regulations that seek to
protect the health and safety of the public and environment.159
The Ninth and Eighth Circuits applied the extraterritoriality principle to
non-price control or price-affirmation statutes. In contrast, the Tenth
Circuit held that the extraterritoriality principle was limited to price control
or affirmation statutes.
The Ninth Circuit and Tenth Circuit both accepted incidental effects on
commerce from state regulations that attempted to influence outside behavior.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found no fault with policies regulating instate commerce with a “goal of influencing the out-of-state choices of

158. See Heydinger II, 825 F.3d at 921.
159. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1105 (“[I]f we were to invalidate
regulation every time another state considered a complementary statute, we would destroy
the states’ ability to experiment with regulation.”); see Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. II, 793
F.3d at 1175 (explaining that if every state regulation that effected interstate commerce
was automatically condemned, valid health and safety laws would be struck down
unnecessarily).
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market participants.”160 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit held that in-state quality
control mandates, while likely creating “ripple effects” both in-state and
out-of-state, do not require almost per se invalidation under extraterritoriality.161
The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, held that the NGEA sought to reduce
emissions occurring entirely outside of Minnesota by preventing MISO
market participants from adding new coal-fired generators to the grid
(despite the fact that the NGEA applied only to imports of electricity for
consumption in Minnesota).162 This suggests that Judge Loken would not
agree with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that state laws that influence outof-state conduct, at least to the extent of reducing out-of-state emissions
for the benefit of in-state emissions reduction goals, are permitted to some
degree. In other words, if it is impermissible for regulations to have the
effect of reducing emissions occurring entirely outside the state, will
states subject to the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction be permitted to account
for out-of-state GHG generators that contribute to in-state harms?163
Lastly, neither the Ninth nor Tenth Circuit truly analyzed extraterritoriality
as its own brand of jurisprudence. For example, the Ninth Circuit’s holding
that lifecycle factors were non-discriminatory set the foundation to then
find that it did not regulate extraterritorially.164 The Tenth Circuit questioned
whether extraterritoriality was a “distinct line of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence at all,” or just an extension of the discrimination analysis.165
VI. CONCLUSION
The essential question is whether the different rulings, upholding
California’s LCFS and Colorado’s RES, while invalidating Minnesota’s
NGEA provisions, were due to a difference in fact patterns, or in the courts’
interpretation and application of the extraterritoriality principle. States are
feeling the impact of global warming-induced climate change. Reducing instate GHG emissions must play an essential role in the battle against climate
change, including reducing emissions from the electricity and transportation
sectors. However, such reductions cannot take place in a vacuum. Due to
the structure of the U.S. power grid, and the physical and chemical properties
of GHGs, the “practical effect” of state climate change prevention policies

160. Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1103.
161. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. II, 793 F.3d at 1173–74.
162. Heydinger II, 825 F.3d at 921–22.
163. Asked in another way, is the reduction of both in-state and out-of-state GHG
emissions contributing to local harm a permissible “ripple effect” of a state law regulating
the type of electricity sold and consumed within its borders?
164. See Rocky Mountain Farmers II, 730 F.3d at 1103.
165. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. II, 793 F.3d at 1173 (explaining the RES did not
“discriminate against out-of-staters”).
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will likely be to account for emissions, and therefore some conduct, of
out-of-state entities. Therefore, inconsistencies in the application of the
extraterritoriality principle across the circuits could have the effect of
halting state progress towards emissions reductions. In an era where climate
change is rapidly changing the Earth’s landscape, this could mean that the
extraterritoriality principle is potentially ill-suited to deal with (and maybe
even a roadblock to) progressive and aggressive state mitigation measures.
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